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Abstract 
 
Using Kauffman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi governance indicators, this article analyzes the 
impact of formal institutions on the knowledge economy- by assessing how the enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) through good governance mechanisms affects the 
knowledge economy. The article also employs the World Bank’s four components of the 
knowledge economy index characteristic of its knowledge for development (K4D) 
framework. We estimate panel data models for 22 Middle East & North African and Sub-
Sahara African countries over the period 1996-2010. The results show that for this group of 
countries the enforcement of IPR laws (treaties), although necessary, is not a sufficient 
condition for a knowledge economy. The results also suggest that other factors are more likely 
to determine the knowledge economies of these nations. Overall these findings have important 
implications for both policy and further research. 
 
JEL Classification: O10; O34; O38; P00; P48 
Keywords: Formal institutions; Knowledge economy; Panel data; Principal component 
analysis (PCA)  
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1. Introduction  
 
 The importance of a knowledge economy (KE) has emerged as a key theme in the late 
1990s as OECD and World Bank reports illustrate (OECD, 2002; World Bank, 2007; Peters, 
2008; Weber, 2011). It is now well established that technological knowledge and innovation 
are long-run drivers of economic growth (Lerner, 2009). Already following the example set 
by Japan, the governments of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and 
China are moving rapidly towards ‘knowledge-based’ economies from ‘product-based’ 
economies (Chandra and Yokoyama, 2011). This is happening because knowledge creation 
and diffusion processes depend on appropriate governance policies that are themselves 
outcomes of good governance – a self-reinforcing and endogenous process. To determine the 
relevance of the Asian experience to other developing and emerging economies, and the 
current excitement with the knowledge economy (KE), it is important to identify the 
institutional factors that promote the creation and diffusion of knowledge, and to ensure that 
economies not at the technological frontier have access to new technologies developed by 
technology leaders. 
 Middle Eastern and North African (MENA), and Sub-Saharan African (SSA) states 
have remained feeble, and according to their governance indicators as measures of 
institutional performance have similarly fared poorly in the last ten years or so. The effect of 
this poor institutional performance on the development, and the main components of the 
knowledge society, of these nations, while not a secret (UNDP, 2009), has not been quantified 
as far as we are aware. With respect to  the MENA region, we know from a World Bank 
report that these nations were not investing in key areas that are fundamental to KEs, and 
specifically that “to date, related investments in education, information infrastructure, 
research and development (R&D), and innovation have been insufficient or inappropriate in 
most MENA countries. Moreover, inadequate economic and institutional frameworks prevent 
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these investments from yielding desired results” (Aubert & Reiffers, 2003, p.1). Similarly, 
Aubert (2007) shows that SSA countries in general have not done well in this regard either, 
mainly because of the weak linkages between institutions and appropriate technologies  that 
are capable of fostering both foreign and domestic investment. These arguments are not hard 
to understand; the institutional framework is crucial for gaining an adequate flow of 
knowledge between scientific research and technological applications, as well as for a good 
information flow between knowledge users and researchers. Governments play a key role; the 
creation of knowledge cannot be left to imperfect market mechanisms. Good governance is 
critical to attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and to motivating domestic 
investment, both of which contribute to the development of the infrastructure of a KE
2
.  
Along the strong interest in the KE themselves has come growing emphases on 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), and hence the acknowledgement that the enforcements of 
IPR laws (treaties) by governments have a critical bearing on how developing economies are 
tilting towards KEs. Based on the situation, the prime objective of this paper is to assess the 
instrumentality of IPR laws (treaties) in various KE dimensions through good governance 
channels
3
. In other words, the paper examines how government enforcement of IPR laws is 
affecting the progress of 22 SSA and MENA countries towards KEs. The examination is 
important because while much emphasis in the literature have gone to developed and 
emerging economies of Latin America and East Asia, there has been little scholarly attention 
paid to the SSA-MENA region. This paper is a modest attempt to fill some of that information 
gap. 
We rationalize this focus with the fact that one of the key pillars of the KE is a 
favorable institutional framework. The importance of this pillar has been covered in the 
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 Though there is no doubt that good governance helps to promote the KE, we admit that the second statement 
may be debatable because FDI on its own may not be a sufficient promoter of KE.  
3
 It should be noted that, there is also a wealth of literature that criticizes the use of IPRs through international 
treaties as forbearers of KE (Drahos, 2002; May & Sell, 2001; May, 2006, 2007).  
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literature on good governance and the knowledge-based economic development in Latin 
America (Dahlan, 2007) and in East Asia (Chandra and Yokoyama, 2011). From the coverage 
a positive relationship between good governance and the creation of KE is discernible. Except 
in China
4
, formal institutions have played an important role in attracting FDI, and thereby 
helped in developing the knowledge-based economic infrastructures necessary for the KEs. 
Unfortunately, this same literature is not as clear for the SSA and MENA region. The few 
papers that have focused on the KE of this region have been limited to the impact of 
knowledge on economic growth using cross-sectional data (Chavula, 2010). While such a 
nexus is important, the current debate has centered around how and whether SSA and MENA 
countries can replicate the ‘East Asian miracle’. Thus, integrating IPRs and governance 
structures into the equation is badly needed to provide an updated account of the debate 
regarding the SSA-MENA countries. 
This paper contributes to existing literature in six different ways. Firstly, unlike 
previous research, it incorporates all dimensions of government quality in its analysis, and 
hence it provides an exhaustive assessment of six institutional quality indicators. Secondly, 
the paper puts an investigating lens on the SSA-MENA region. A great chunk of research on 
the KE focuses on developed and emerging economies of Latin America and East Asia, 
unfortunately leaving behind only scanty evidence of the nexus in SSA and MENA countries. 
Thirdly, in contrast to the mainstream approach which is premised mostly on one or two 
dimensions of the KE, this paper employs all of the four components in the World Bank’s 
Knowledge Economy Index (KEI): economic incentive, innovation, education, and 
information infrastructure. Fourthly, the significant trends in the KE development witnessed 
worldwide over the last decade have brought to clear light the growing relevance of IPR 
treaties, and therefore assessing how the enforcement of these laws affects various dimensions 
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 China’s success story in attracting FDI is largely attributed to a spectacular growth track record, the relative 
better executive power, political stability, good infrastructure, abundant educated labor force and a large 
domestic market (Chandra & Yokoyama, 2011, p.46).  
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of KE via good governance in developing countries could provide the needed guidance to 
policy makers. Fifthly, while some aspects of KE might have been investigated before good 
governance indicators for developing countries were available, this paper uses recent data to 
update the account of the nexus, and it does so with focused policy implications. Sixthly, one 
motivation of this work is the ongoing debate on the ‘East Asian miracle’, which has been 
either based on concepts like ‘soft authoritarian character’ and/or ‘governing the market’. 
Such a debate is premised on certain political and economic conditions that were somehow 
judged propitious for development. However, some other evidence suggests to the contrary 
that the ‘East Asian miracle’ could have been caused instead by low enforcement of IPR 
regimes at the early stages of these nations’ development, e.g., gains from trade distortions 
like undervalued rates of currency exchange and even innovation copying (imitations), in 
addition to the accumulation of human and physical capital (Bezmen & Depken, 2004). Still 
other evidence Lucas argues that there was not anything miraculous about the East Asian 
miracle (1988; 1993). Hence, examining this debate in the context of SSA and MENA 
countries could result in relevant policy and further research recommendations.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theory 
and its empirical evidence. Data and methodology issues are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 
presents and discusses the empirical results, while Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Theory and empirical evidence 
 
2.1 Institutions and knowledge-based economies    
 
The fundamental challenge in fostering any KE is to harness knowledge for 
development by providing an enabling environment for a competitive educational system, 
highly qualified human resources, excellent information, communication technology 
infrastructure (ICT), and a capable scientific infrastructure for innovations (Chandra & 
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Yokoyama, 2011). Where domestic R & D is weak or nonexistent, FDI is a good, though 
imperfect, substitute, and hence extant literature suggests that the main institutional 
impediment to FDI may not lie in its effect on the rates of return on investing abroad, but also 
on the excess risk that such investment entails. Unlike trade, foreign investment is not only 
subject to a risk of predation and hold-up, but also to expropriation and nationalization risks. 
For example, Harms & Ursprung (2002) argue that authoritarian regimes are associated with a 
greater risk of policy reversals due to the dictator’s own whims, the need to raise public 
support through populist measures, or simply coups d’etat. Globerman & Shapiro (2002), 
Stern (2003), and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) also find that various measures of governance 
quality are related to FDI inflows. All this work shows that the quality of institutions and of 
the regulatory system operating in an economy, have a significant impact on inward FDI, and 
the latter affects the KE, especially in developing countries. 
Finally, Lambsdorff (2003) finds that the predictability of corruption has an impact on 
inward capital flows that is distinct from the impact of the level of corruption. Other authors 
find that defective institutions tend to be correlated with lower literacy rates, larger public 
investment in unproductive assets (Mauro, 1998), and lower expenditures devoted to the 
maintenance of past projects than effective institutions. Hence, by encouraging unproductive 
public investments that result in less efficient public facilities and a slow accumulation of 
human capital, defective institutions also indirectly hamper countries’ attractiveness to foreign 
investment, and therefore the development of the KE. 
 
 
2.2 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in Knowledge Economy (KE) 
 
 According to the literature there are two main avenues along which IP and the strength 
of IPR regimes influence the level of KE, which we describe briefly below (Bezmen & 
Depken, 2004; Andrés & Goel, 2012). The first captures the degree to which IPRs influence 
8 
 
the creation of new knowledge and information within individual nations, as well as the 
diffusion of existing knowledge across countries. The second is the indirect effect of a 
nation’s IPR regime on international transactions that provide factors crucial for the growth 
process.   
 
2.2.1 Creation and dissemination of information 
 
 The endogenous theories of economic growth, whereby investment in research and 
development (R&D) results in profit (returns) to individual investors and also increases 
society’s stock of knowledge, represent the basis for IPRs protection. According to Romer 
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), for instance, by diminishing the cost of future 
innovation, the accumulation of knowledge fosters economic growth. Grossman and Lai 
(2004) describe the benefits of establishing an effective system of intellectual property rights, 
but some researchers find that the effects of IPRs on growth depends on the level of economic 
development, that there is some threshold, and we say more on that argument later, 
fundamentally, tighter and more restrictive IPRs may serve as stimuli to growth by 
encouraging innovations and inventions. It then follows naturally that individuals engage in 
innovative activities in response to expected rewards for their efforts. Following Baumol 
(1993), Bezmen & Depken (2004) suggest that this aspiration is in fact the primary motivation 
for any entrepreneurial activity, and it increases both total factor productivity and output level.  
 The concentration of patent holdings and R&D expenditures is in the industrialized 
world and where enforcement costs are positively linked with the tightening of IPRs. 
However, such concentration seems to imply that stronger IPRs increase royalty gains to 
developed countries (and to the creators of technological advancements) at the expense of 
developing countries. This has led some authors to argue that net consumers of technological 
innovation have an incentive to enforce IPRs only when the innovation they consume differs 
from the type of innovation they supply to foreign markets (Diwan & Rodrik, 1991). It 
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follows that the effectiveness of IPRs may be substantially contingent on the country’s present 
stage of development. More stringent IPR regimes may restrict diffusion of knowledge and 
technological development in ‘technology followers’ while stimulating innovation in 
‘technology leaders’ (Bezmen & Depken, 2004).  
Traditionally, industrialized nations have depended substantially on the protection 
offered by IPRs. In contrast, less developed countries have often preferred quick 
dissemination of knowledge at the cost of protecting the IPRs of foreigners. From this 
perspective, many newly industrialized countries have recently pushed for stronger IPRs via 
bilateral, multilateral, and regional agreements (Mshomba, 2009). This difference in approach 
could be attributed to the desire of developing countries to specialize in labor intensive 
production in agricultural industries. Labor-intensive industries, until recently, have largely 
been supported by public expenditures on research and technology and have substantially 
gained from shared knowledge spillovers. One application of this argument gaining increasing 
relevance is the access to and affordability of life-saving drugs, especially with regard to the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS in developing countries. Intense pressure is being placed on 
pharmaceutical companies to ‘loosen’ their patent rights in a bid to allow poor countries the 
opportunity of better managing the AIDS pandemic (See Mshomba, 2009).   
 
2.2.2 International effects 
 
According to Bezmen & Depken (2004), IPRs may also affect a nation’s growth and 
development process by disengaging it from international transactions (e.g., trade, technology 
transfers, and FDI inflows). The potential growth rewards emanating from increased 
participation in international trade have been covered in the literature. For example, it is 
widely accepted that international trade can be an important stimulus to economic prosperity 
since access to world markets could spur greater utilization of idle human capital resources 
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than possible under autarky (Todaro & Smith, 2003). However, a more stringent IPR regime 
may also be an important factor in attracting inflows of FDI and technological transfers
5
. In 
addition, individual (investors and firms) views about the strength of a nation’s IPR regime 
positively affects such nations’ receipts of FDI and the willingness of foreigners to transfer 
newer technologies (Lee & Mansfield, 1996). It has also been well documented that strong 
IPRs have a positive incidence on a nation’s level of exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995) and 
they increase the likelihood of investment undertaken by multinational companies (Mansfield, 
1994; Seyoum, 1996). However, Yang & Maskus (2001) note that, stronger IPRs protection 
could also reduce the need for FDI, while Andrés (2006), and Goel and Nelson (2009) have 
found copyright protection and income to be the most determining factors of IPRs in the 
software industry. 
 
2.3 Bases for instrumental variables  
  
In this section, we provide a theoretical justification for the empirical validity of the 
instruments. This justification is crucial for the empirical analysis required for sound and 
consistent interpretation of estimated coefficients. Moreover, the objective of this paper is not 
only to assess the impact of formal institutions on KE, but also to examine how the 
enforcement of IPR laws by formal institutions is instrumental in KE. The presentation is in 
two main strands: the first strand provides theoretical linkages between IP treaties, 
government quality and KE; and the second strand justifies the instrumentality of income-
levels, legal-origin, and religious-domination. Regarding, the first strand, logic and common-
sense have it that IPR laws (treaties) are mostly enforceable only through good governance 
mechanisms. The most widely known IPR instruments enforced by governments are: main IP 
laws, IP rights laws, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties, and 
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Multilateral (Bilateral) treaties. The empirical section of this paper uses aspects of this strand 
as instruments. 
With respect to the second strand, we provide a theoretical justification for the choice 
of income-levels, legal-origin, and religious-domination as relevant instrumental variables. (1) 
From an income-level perspective, high-income countries have tighter IPRs, better 
governance than their low-income counterparts, and stronger KE (Maskus, 2000). Legal-
origins differ in their emphases on private property rights vis-à-vis the powers of the state (La 
Porta et al., 1998; Beck et al., 2003). Religious-domination is also crucial. The Islamic 
economic model, for instance, is based on and regulated by the same Shari’ya principles as 
the overall society (Iqbal, 1997), whereas in non-Islamic economies there is at least a 
theoretical separation of religion and state.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
3.1.1 Dependent variables  
 
Borrowing from Chavula (2010) and Weber (2011), our dependent variables are 
extracted from the World Bank’s knowledge index which consists of four dimensions: an 
economic incentive & institutional regime; educated & skilled workers; an effective 
innovation system; and a modern & adequate information infrastructure. Our argument for 
that choice is that to date, efforts to measure knowledge have been undertaken at one of two 
levels: first, at the individual firm level; and second, at the national systems level. Inevitably, 
because knowledge has informal and tacit aspects, on the one hand, as well as formal or 
codified forms, on the other hand, all such measurements involve proxies and indirect 
estimates. Firm level measurement arises out of business initiatives to manage knowledge and 
measure intangible assets. These efforts are operationalized at the micro level and use a 
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combination of accounting and non-financial indicators to measure stocks of intellectual or 
knowledge capital, and the flows of changes in knowledge stocks (OECD, 2002). The 
knowledge capacity of firms is proxied by means of instruments like balanced scorecards, 
intangible assets monitor, intellectual capital accounts and stylized models of knowledge 
spillovers (Sveiby, 1997; Lev, 2001; Boudreau, 2002). In addition to knowledge stocks and 
flows, knowledge enablers are measured as a way of identifying practices with the potential to 
change or maintain knowledge stocks and flows. These may include either leadership, 
strategy, organizational partnerships, or talent (Kermally, 2002). 
At the macro level, economic models capture the generation of ideas and their 
association with wealth in the production function framework. Conceptually, the generic 
production function relates total product to labor, capital, and other inputs that combine to 
produce it. The deficiency of the basic production function, especially in its Cobb-Douglas 
functional form, in handling new innovations and endogenous technical change has since 
resulted in many refinements, dating back to the seminal work of Solow (1957) and 
Abramovitz (1956). The subsequent ‘growth accounting’ literature attempts to disaggregate 
the residual in the standard production function by employing increasingly sophisticated 
econometric methods. Since knowledge is seen as embodied in technical change (Solow, 
1957; Abramovitz, 1956; Amavilah, 2009), it is the ‘knowledge production function,’ which 
postulates the generation of new knowledge as dependent on R&D capital, labor, and other 
inputs. Various measures of ‘new knowledge’, including citation weighted patents as well as 
new product announcements have been used in these econometric models (see Griliches, 
1990, 1992, for discussions on related efforts). An additional complication besides measuring 
knowledge either as an input or output is that knowledge can also be measure as a quantity 
like average years of schooling, for instance (Bils & Klenow, 2000), a quality as in cognitive 
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skills (see, e.g., Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008; Hanushek & Kimko, 2000), as well as along 
interactions between quality and quantity.  
To deal with complications like this one, there has been a variety of attempts by 
international bodies and countries to develop indices of science, technology or knowledge 
standing (see, e.g., Grupp & Mogee, 2004). For example, the UNDP’s (2001) Technology 
Achievement Index is a comparative national macro-composite of indicators for technology 
creation (e.g., patents per capita), diffusion of new innovations (e.g., internet hosts per capita), 
diffusion of old innovations (e.g. telephones per capita), and human skills (e.g., mean years of 
schooling for people over 15 years). Similarly, to develop composite indices of innovation 
performance for EU member states, US, and Japan, the 2004 European Innovation Scoreboard 
employs 20 indicators comprised of the following four groups: human resources; the creation 
of new knowledge; the transmission and application of knowledge; and innovation, finance, 
output and markets (Commission of the European Communities, 2004). The ‘creation of 
knowledge’ indicators include public and business R&D/GDP and high tech 
patents/population. The ‘transmission and application of knowledge indicators’ include 
proportion of small and mid-size enterprises (SMEs) that report making innovations or 
collaborating in innovations, innovation expenditures/sales and non-technical innovations by 
SMEs. The UNDP, EU, and other similar indices draw on available data reported at the 
national level, from which national comparisons of standings are then made. This choice of 
dependent variables is also consistent with recent KE literature (Asongu, 2012a).  
 
3.1.2 Independent variables  
 
Our explanatory variable of interest is governance, which is a multidimensional and 
broad term. We define governance as the way in which policy makers are empowered to make 
decisions and the manner in which policy decisions are formulated and implemented. To 
operationalize this concept we use a set of governance indicators that capture different aspects 
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of governance. The World Bank indicators meet the requirement because they are constructed 
from several sources including polls of experts, and surveys of residents and entrepreneurs 
within a country and they could be grouped into three concepts (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2010). The first concept is about the process by which those in authority are 
selected and replaced [Political Governance]: voice & accountability and political stability. 
The second has to do with the capacity of government to formulate & implement policies, and 
to deliver services [Economic Governance]: regulatory quality and government effectiveness. 
The last, but by no means least, regards the respect for citizens and the state of institutions 
that govern the interactions among them [Institutional Governance]: rule of law and control of 
corruption. 
Each indicator, normalized to range from -2.5 to 2.5, with a zero mean and a standard 
deviation of one, provides a subjective assessment of some aspect of a country’s quality of 
governance. Higher values signal better governance. Although the quality of available data 
suffers from the data aggregation problems, one of the advantages of aggregate indicators is 
that they are more informative about broad concepts of governance. Individual data provides a 
noisy signal of the broader concept of governance. Aggregate indicators also provide a 
country-wide coverage than individual indicators. Moreover, we use each indicator in 
isolation since they measure different aspects of the impact of governance on KE. This 
perspective is supported by the recent piracy literature which has shown that these variables 
interact differently with IPRs to produce different effects on software piracy (Andrés & 
Asongu, 2013a). 
 
3.1.3 Control and instrumental variables  
 
We consider the following eight control variables: population growth, financial depth, 
GDP growth, financial size, inflation, government expenditure, domestic investment and 
financial efficiency.  The choice of only eight control variables is contingent on constraints in 
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the “Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR)” test for instrument validity6. Our general expectation 
is that population growth has a positive linkage with the ICT and Education dimensions of the 
KE (Asongu, 2012a). Likewise, we expect government expenditure to stimulate KE if 
investment resources are efficiently allocated, and not tainted by corruption, for example. 
Inflation should increase the credit dimension of economic incentive and mitigate the demand 
for ICT owing to rising prices. Broadly speaking, GDP growth, financial size, financial depth, 
investment and financial allocation efficiency are also potential drivers of KE.   
As rationalized in Section 2.3 above, instrumental variables include: Constitution, 
Main Intellectual Property Law, Intellectual Property Rights Law, WIPO Treaties, 
Multilateral Treaties, Bilateral Treaties, Income-levels, Legal-origin and Religious-
domination. Moreover, other instrumental variables, besides ‘IPR treaties’, have been well 
documented in the recent African growth and development literature (Beck, et. al, 2003; 
Stultz & Williamson, 2003, Agbor, 2011; Asongu, 2012b) and IPRs (Andrés & Asongu, 
2013a,b)
7
.  
We estimate pooled time-series cross-section (panel data) regressions, using annual 
observations for 22 SSA and MENA countries for the years 1996-2010
8
. Since some of the 
data are not available for all countries and/or all years, the panel data is unbalanced and the 
number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. Details about variable 
definitions, data sources, summary statistics, and correlation analysis are presented in the 
appendices. The ‘summary statistics’ (Appendix 1) of the variables used in the panel 
regressions show that there is a substantial degree of variation in the data utilized.  The 
correlation matrix (Appendix 2) was examined with the purpose of mitigating concerns 
                                                 
6
An OIR test is only applicable in the presence of over-identification, that is, the instruments must be higher than 
the endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In the cases of exact- identification 
(instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under-identifications (instruments less than 
endogenous explaining variables) an OIR test is by definition impossible.  
7
 It should also be noted that in developing economies, local norms and practices that matter are reflected by the 
formal institutional channels.  
8
The 22 MENA and SSA countries are listed in Table 1A, Panel B, in the Appendix. Good governance indicators 
for these countries are only available as from 1996 (See Development Indicators of the World Bank).  
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resulting from overparametization and multicolinearity. Based on a preliminary assessment of 
the correlation coefficients, there do not appear to be any serious issues in terms of the 
relationships to be estimated.  Appendix 3 provides definitions and sources of the variables.   
 
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
An obvious limitation of this paper is that we are interested primarily in evaluating 
empirically the impact of formal institutions on KE, ceteris paribus. One might also criticize 
the redundancy in the information provided for each dimension of the KE index, since each 
dimension could be correlated with its component variables individually. For this reason, we 
use principal component analysis (PCA), a common statistical technique that is used to reduce 
a large set of correlated variables into a small set of uncorrelated variables, called principal 
components that account for most of variation in the original data set. 
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis  
        
Knowledge Economy 
dimensions 
Component Matrix(Loadings) First 
P.C 
Eigen Value Indexes 
Education  
 
School 
enrolment  
PSE SSE TSE    
Educatex 0.535 0.620 0.574 0.771 2.313 
        
Information & 
Infrastructure 
ICTs  Internet  Mobile  Telephone    
ICTex 0.653 0.661 0.371 0.705 2.115 
      
 
Economic 
Incentive 
Trade & 
Tariffs  
Trade Tariffs    
Tradex -0.707 0.707 
 
0.645 1.290 
Credit & 
IR Spread  
Private Credit  Interest rate spread    
Creditex -0.707 0.707 0.679 1.358 
       
 
Innovation  
Scientific 
Journals  
 
 Reducing the dimensions of these is impractical owing to low correlation and 
conceptual dissimilarity.  FDI 
Inflows 
       
PSE: Primary School Enrolment. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment.TSE: Tertiary School Enrolment. PC: Principal Component. ICTs: 
Information and Communication Technologies. IR: Interest Rate.  FDI: Foreign Direct Investment.  
 
Table 1 displays the first principal component (PC) accounts for approximately 65% 
of the variation in all four KE dimensions. The criteria applied to determine how many 
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common factors to retain are taken from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002). They recommend 
dropping factors with an eigenvalue smaller than one. Note also that the weights in the first 
PC are almost equal across dimensions, indicating that a one PC model is appropriate for each 
KE dimension in our sample. 
 
3.2.2 Endogeneity  
 
 While a KE depends on formal institutions, we acknowledge that the reverse effect 
cannot be ruled-out, because as an economy grows in knowledge, it tends to have better 
governance mechanisms that enforce stringent IPR regimes. This endogeneity represents a 
reverse-causality. Also, governance indicators are measures of perception, subject to 
significant media propaganda bias, which in turn lends credibility to the endogeneity concern. 
In the empirical IPR literature Bezmen & Depken (2004) have insisted that studies 
investigating the IPRs-development nexus are subject to potential endogeneity problems, 
because it is likely that a nation’s level of development is a crucial factor in the choice of, or 
adherence to, a particular IPR regime. This confirms an earlier thesis by Ginarte & Park 
(1997) which reveals that the level of economic development explains the strength of patent 
protection provided by individual countries. So, before tackling this endogeneity concern, we 
examine briefly its presence with the Hausman test and then employ an estimation technique 
compatible with the outcome of the test.  
 
3.2.3 Estimation technique  
 
 Following Beck et al. (2003) and recent African development literature (Asongu, 
2013), the paper adopts a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variables (IV) 
approach. The IV estimation technique deals effectively with the endogeneity puzzle, and 
therefore avoids the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
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which normally arises when the exogenous variables are correlated with the error term. In 
accordance with recent IPRs literature, the 2SLS estimation will entail the following steps: 
First-stage regression:  
 
ititiit vsInstrumentGQ  )(10                                              (1)                                         
Second-stage regression: 
 itiit GQKE )(10  iti X2   it                   (2) 
In Eqs. (1) and (2), GQ represents governance, measuring the institutional quality of 
government in regards to the rule of law, regulation quality, voice & accountability, 
government effectiveness, political stability/no violence and corruption-control, and γi are the 
estimated effects on GQ of instruments, where instruments refer to the variables described 
above. KE denotes the dimensions of a KE also outlined above, and β1i are estimated impacts 
of GQ on KE. Xit is a set of control variables described above and listed in the Appendix, so 
that β2i are their corresponding effects on KE. Lastly, v and u represent the error terms. Again, 
to deploy the estimation technique, we (1) justify the choice of a 2SLS over an OLS 
estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (2) verify the instruments are 
exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining (GQ channels); and (3) ensure the 
instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the main equation with an 
Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. Further robustness checks are ensured with 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors. The results follow 
next. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
This section has two parts. The first sub-section below presents the main empirical findings. 
The second sub-section interprets the results for policy and further research. 
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4.1 Presentation of results 
 
This sub-section deals with results relating to two main issues: (1) the capacity of the 
exogenous components of the GQ channels to explain KE dimensions; and (2) the ability of 
the instruments to explain KE dimensions beyond the GQ channels. While the first issue is 
addressed by the significance of estimated coefficients, the second is contingent on the 
outcome of the OIR Sargan test. This method explains why we do not include the F-test 
because for the IV approach it is not an indispensable statistics and alternative tests like the 
Cragg and Donald (1993) could as well have been used. Having said that, the null hypothesis 
of this test is the position that the instruments explain KE only through GQ channels, i.e., IPR 
laws (treaties) that affect KE dimensions are enforced only through good governance 
mechanisms. Hence, a rejection of this null hypothesis is a rejection of the stance that the IPR 
laws (treaties) affecting KE dimensions are not enforced beyond formal good governance 
institutions. A Hausman test for endogeneity precedes every 2SLS approach. The null 
hypothesis of this test is that OLS estimates are efficient and consistent. Thus, a rejection of 
this hypothesis points to the presence of inconsistent estimates owing to endogeneity and 
hence, lends credit to the choice of the 2SLS approach. Tables 2-7 present results for various 
components of KE. The education (Table 2), information & infrastructure (Table 3), 
economic incentive (Tables 4-5), and innovation (Tables 6-7) components of KE are 
regressed on GQ channels, conditional on other control variables using HAC standard errors. 
For all models, the Hausman test overwhelmingly rejects the null hypothesis, confirms the 
presence of endogeneity, and supports the adoption of a 2SLS modeling approach.  
Except for regulation quality (which has the right sign but an insignificant estimate),  
the educational dimension of KE (Table 2), but for GQ mitigates education in KE (first issue) 
and the enforcement of IPR laws (treaties) by GQ channels does not stimulate education in 
KE (second issue). With respect to the information & infrastructure dimension of KE (Table 
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3), while GQ dynamics of voice & accountability, political stability and regulation quality 
address the first issue, only the first of the three, addresses the second issue, and these 
interpretations are in line with those of Table 2. Concerning the economic incentive side of 
KE (Tables 4-5), no conclusions could be drawn from findings on private credit and interest 
rate spread (Creditex) owing to insignificant estimates. However, the results on trade 
openness and tariffs (Tradex) demonstrate that the enforcement of IPR laws (treaties) through 
voice & accountability and regulation quality significantly infringes on trade openness. 
Looking at the innovation component of KE (Tables 6-7), the upholding of tighter IP regimes 
through political and regulatory quality mechanisms has a negative incidence on the 
publication of scientific and technical journals (Table 6). The findings pertaining to FDI 
inflows (Table 7) do not enable us to establish any conclusions owing to insignificance of 
good governance estimates. However, in reporting such findings we are suggesting that 
statistical significance does not always imply economic significance. Overall it is clear that  
the adoption of tight IP regimes and their enforcements by formal institutional mechanisms 
do not stimulate KE in SSA and MENA countries.  
Most control variables are significant and have correct signs. For example, 
government expenditure improves education as well as information and communication 
infrastructure. In addition, improvements in macroeconomic financial intermediary dynamics 
of efficiency and size boosts information and communication infrastructure owing to 
increased economic activity. Furthermore, government expenditure and economic prosperity 
could lead to a favorable climate for FDI inflows. Given the strength of control variables 
relative to the weakness of governance indicators in determining KE, it would seem that the 
prospects for the KE in this group of countries are brightest with improvements in the control 
variables as opposed to the independent variables. 
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Table 2: Effect of governance on education (with HAC standard errors)  
 Dependent variable: Educatex 
Constant  0.883* -0.737 1.030 -0.050 0.494 0.681 
 (1.688) (-0.640) (1.905) (-0.047) (0.704) (0.940) 
Voice & Accountability  -0.483*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (-3.272)      
Political Stability  --- -0.916*** --- --- --- --- 
  (-3.513)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -0.557* --- --- --- 
   (-1.685)    
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- -0.408 --- --- 
    (-0.810)   
Rule of Law --- --- --- --- -0.746*** --- 
     (-3.146)  
Control of Corruption  --- --- --- --- --- -0.810*** 
      (-2.770) 
Trade -0.000 0.034* -0.001 0.012 0.007 0.006 
 (-0.012) (1.945) (-0.279) (0.530) (1.414) (1.188) 
Population Growth -1.434*** -1.259*** -1.438*** -1.131*** -1.514*** -1.532*** 
 (-6.434) (-4.890) (-5.162) (-5.171) (-6.275) (-6.045) 
Inflation 0.113*** 0.036 0.084** 0.052 0.099*** 0.098*** 
 (4.621) (0.879) (2.042) (1.061) (3.743) (3.714) 
Government Expenditure 0.141*** 0.103*** 0.139*** 0.104*** 0.154*** 0.172*** 
 (6.256) (6.218) (3.960) (6.401) (7.151) (7.022) 
Financial depth  -0.350 -1.987 0.187 -0.315 -0.219 -0.696 
 (-0.404) (-1.642) (0.209) (-0.810) (-0.340) (-1.190) 
       
Hausman test  100.44*** 38.168*** 65.609*** 30.488*** 54.009*** 44.126*** 
 [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
Sargan OIR  3.938 2.677 5.604 10.600* 4.427 3.675 
 [0.558]  [0.749] [0.346]  [0.059] [0.489]  [0.597] 
Adjusted R² 0.584 0.640 0.536 0.645 0.568 0.542 
Fisher 82.558*** 65.541*** 101.21*** 111.44*** 211.47*** 261.43*** 
Observations  79 79 79 79 79 79 
       
Instruments  Constant; Constitution;  Main_IP_law;  IP_rlaw;  Wipo_treaties;  Mutilateral; 
Bilateral;  LM_Income;  M_Income;  H_Income; English; Christians. 
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions.  [] :P-values. z-statistics 
in brackets. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. Educatex is the first principal component of primary, 
secondary and tertiary school enrolments.  
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Table 3: Effect of governance on Information & Infrastructure (with HAC standard errors)  
 Dependent variable: ICTex 
Constant  -15.490*** -7.799*** -20.86* -6.874*** -22.708 -18.322* 
 (-2.838) (-3.457) (-1.702) (-3.874) (-1.160) (-1.692) 
Voice & Accountability  -2.053* --- --- --- --- --- 
 (-1.704)      
Political Stability  --- -1.309*** --- --- --- --- 
  (-2.643)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -4.695 --- --- --- 
   (-1.155)    
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- -2.352*** --- --- 
    (-2.929)   
Rule of Law --- --- --- --- -5.246 --- 
     (-0.754)  
Control of Corruption  --- --- --- --- --- -3.436 
      (-1.081) 
Trade -0.031* -0.002 -0.019 0.026 0.026 -0.003 
 (-1.793) (-0.196) (-0.808) (1.146) (0.371) (-0.146) 
Population Growth -0.036 -0.512 -0.035 -0.593 0.260 0.373 
 (-0.036) (-1.260) (-0.037) (-1.617) (0.145) (0.330) 
Inflation 0.282 0.107** 0.117 -0.009 0.048 0.066 
 (1.639) (2.084) (0.556) (-0.179) (0.145) (0.326) 
Government Expenditure 0.095 -0.021 0.162* -0.056 0.159 0.156** 
 (1.535) (-0.595) (1.896) (-1.339) (1.186) (2.004) 
Economic Prosperity  -0.538 0.550 -0.478 0.627 -0.794 -0.762 
 (-0.432) (1.247) (-0.379) (1.523) (-0.342) (-0.556) 
Domestic Investment  -0.034 -0.019 -0.135 0.009 -0.113 -0.015 
 (-0.240) (-0.202) (-0.428) (0.102) (-0.235) (-0.057) 
Financial Size 16.857** 5.752** 22.447 3.934 22.095 18.292 
 (2.096) (2.509) (1.212) (1.615) (0.835) (1.108) 
Financial Efficiency  -4.736* 1.492** 8.114 -0.695 7.193 5.135 
 (-1.704) (2.229) (1.445) (-1.023) (0.957) (1.337) 
       
Hausman test  120.36*** 55.345*** 151.62*** 42.352*** 157.7*** 136.71*** 
 [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
Sargan OIR  1.359 8.875** 0.213 9.33*** 0.068 0.414 
 [0.506]  [0.011] [0.898]  [0.009] [0.966]  [0.812] 
Adjusted R² 0.090 0.063 0.096 0.116 0.054 0.080 
Fisher 4.174*** 11.687*** 2.318** 9.410*** 1.062 1.823* 
Observations  139 139 139 139 139 139 
       
Instruments  Constant; Constitution;  Main_IP_law;  IP_rlaw;  Wipo_treaties;  Mutilateral; 
Bilateral; LM_Income; M_Income;  H_Income; English; Christians. 
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions.  []:P-values. z-statistics in 
brackets. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. ICTex is the first principal component of mobile phones, 
telephone and internet users.  
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Table 4: Effect of governance on First Economic Incentive (with HAC standard errors)  
 Dependent variable: Tradex 
Constant  4.537*** 5.380*** 3.830 5.188*** 3.944 4.303* 
 (2.677) (3.521) (1.551) (3.425) (1.631) (1.730) 
Voice & Accountability  -0.710* --- --- --- --- --- 
 (-1.855)      
Political Stability  --- -0.582 --- --- --- --- 
  (-1.427)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -1.166 --- --- --- 
   (-1.302)    
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- -0.690* --- --- 
    (-1.833)   
Rule of Law --- --- --- --- -1.032 --- 
     (-1.525)  
Control of Corruption  --- --- --- --- --- -0.906 
      (-1.245) 
Trade --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Population Growth 0.318 0.047 0.175 -0.088 0.048 0.200 
 (1.173) (0.180) (0.731) (-0.308) (0.208) (0.875) 
Inflation -0.072 -0.103** -0.129*** -0.114 -0.126*** -0.133*** 
 (-1.433) (-2.385) (-2.618) (-2.552) (-2.822) (-2.858) 
Government Expenditure 0.003 -0.061 -0.009 -0.067 -0.035 -0.016 
 (0.059) (-0.991) (-0.210) (-1.215) (-0.883) (-0.379) 
Economic Prosperity  -0.486 0.005 -0.221 0.152 -0.005 -0.184 
 (-1.091) (0.014) (-0.653) (0.378) (-0.016) (-0.530) 
Domestic Investment  0.051 0.053 0.002 0.051 -0.020 0.005 
 (0.662) (0.657) (0.031) (0.719) (-0.217) (0.058) 
Financial Size -4.075** -4.972** -2.466 -4.525* -1.905 -2.621 
 (-2.417) (-1.997) (-0.792) (-1.910) (-0.653) (-0.801) 
Financial Efficiency  -0.229 -1.504* -0.042 -2.056*** -0.851 -0.829 
 (-0.159) (-1.886) (-0.025) (-2.872) (-0.860) (-0.728) 
       
Hausman test  47.828*** 75.876*** 50.741*** 64.734*** 46.119*** 71.148*** 
 [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
Sargan OIR  1.295 0.937 1.947 0.830 0.343 0.515 
 [0.730 ]  [0.816 ] [0.583 ]  [0.842 ] [0.951 ]  [0.915 ] 
Adjusted R² 0.085 0.158 0.204 0.164 0.311 0.204 
Fisher 13.683*** 11.514*** 6.222*** 13.196*** 9.529*** 11.258*** 
Observations  82 82 82 82 82 82 
       
Instruments  Constant; Constitution;  Main_IP_law;  IP_rlaw;  Wipo_treaties;  Mutilateral; 
Bilateral;  LM_Income;  M_Income;  H_Income; English; Christians. 
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions.  [] :P-values. z-statistics in 
brackets. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. Tradex is the first principal component of trade openness 
and tariffs.  
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Table 5: Effect of governance on Second Economic Incentive (with HAC standard errors)  
 Dependent variable: Creditex 
Constant  9.433** 5.036 8.464 4.127 2.966 6.506 
 (2.153) (1.781) (1.310) (1.427) (1.216) (1.596) 
Voice & Accountability  1.293 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (1.532)      
Political Stability  --- 0.576 --- --- --- --- 
  (1.515)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- 1.509 --- --- --- 
   (0.639)    
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- 0.313 --- --- 
    (0.914)   
Rule of Law --- --- --- --- -0.230 --- 
     (-0.317)  
Control of Corruption  --- --- --- --- --- 0.742 
      (0.622) 
Population Growth 0.368 0.418 0.307 0.376* 0.186 0.277 
 (1.480) (1.622) (0.973) (1.677) (0.829) (1.123) 
Inflation -0.036 0.050 0.060 0.071 0.076 0.069 
 (-0.302) (0.591) (0.484) (0.870) (1.097) (0.650) 
Government Expenditure -0.062 -0.025 -0.083** -0.041 -0.050** -0.073** 
 (-2.578) (-0.676) (-2.084) (-1.126) (-2.192) (-2.407) 
Economic Prosperity  0.026 -0.383 0.007 -0.294 -0.074 -0.056 
 (0.122) (-1.354) (0.022) (-1.223) (-0.346) (-0.244) 
Domestic Investment  0.001 0.043 0.044 0.029 -0.014 0.012 
 (0.012) (0.442) (0.237) (0.265) (-0.121) (0.099) 
Financial Size -6.865 -3.991 -7.615 -3.511 -1.946 -5.408 
 (-1.492) (-1.253) (-0.816) (-1.128) (-0.656) (-0.942) 
Financial Efficiency  -4.396*** -2.043** -4.174 -1.489 -1.317 -2.840** 
 (-2.733) (-2.023) (-1.384) (-1.359) (-1.252) (-2.126) 
       
Hausman test  238.74*** 143.68*** 101.37*** 113.22*** 54.186*** 89.189*** 
 [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
Sargan OIR  6.155 11.097** 6.755* 15.858*** 25.963*** 10.603** 
 [0.104]  [0.011] [0.080]  [0.001] [ 0.000]  [0.014] 
Adjusted R² 0.302 0.306 0.172 0.300 0.396 0.232 
Fisher 21.245*** 6.265*** 23.544*** 17.405*** 125.22*** 14.145*** 
Observations  105 105 105 105 105 105 
       
Instruments  Constant; Constitution;  Main_IP_law;  IP_rlaw;  Wipo_treaties;  Mutilateral; 
Bilateral;  LM_Income;  M_Income;  H_Income; English; Christians. 
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions.  [] :P-values. z-statistics in 
brackets. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. Creditex is the first principal component of private 
domestic credit and interest rate spreads.  
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Table 6: Effect of governance on Technical & Scientific Journals (with HAC standard errors)  
 Dependent variable: LogJournals  
Constant  0.555 0.600 -2.665 1.958 -4.950 -7.861 
 (0.285) (0.424) (-0.672) (1.214) (-0.898) (-0.918) 
Voice & Accountability  -0.315 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (-0.701)      
Political Stability  --- -0.952*** --- --- --- --- 
  (-3.928)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -1.301 --- --- --- 
   (-0.889)    
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- -1.045*** --- --- 
    (-5.234)   
Rule of Law --- --- --- --- -1.866 --- 
     (-1.358)  
Control of Corruption  --- --- --- --- --- -2.251 
      (-1.030) 
Population Growth 0.256 -0.087 0.282 -0.291** 0.067 0.433 
 (1.475) (-0.470) (1.498) (-2.139) (0.222) (1.380) 
Inflation -0.030 -0.021 -0.033 -0.075** -0.003 0.005 
 (-0.584) (-0.543) (-0.540) (-2.016) (-0.026) (0.039) 
Government Expenditure 0.045 0.008 0.070* 0.012 0.080*** 0.100** 
 (1.450) (0.504) (1.898) (0.731) (2.578) (2.296) 
Economic Prosperity  -0.557** 0.088 -0.613** 0.300 -0.341 -0.776** 
 (-1.980) (0.305) (-2.104) (1.553) (-0.840) (-2.116) 
Domestic Investment  0.109 -0.007 0.084 -0.021 0.0001 0.068 
 (1.144) (-0.118) (0.702) (-0.444) (0.001) (0.418) 
Financial Size 0.642 0.446 4.312 -0.019 7.707 10.504 
 (0.234) (0.286) (0.757) (-0.011) (1.149) (0.914) 
Financial Efficiency  0.830 1.233** 1.793 0.020 1.902 1.919 
 (1.368) (2.440) (1.548) (0.063) (1.403) (1.168) 
       
Hausman test  80.646*** 143.89*** 86.621*** 130.43*** 115.82*** 154.37*** 
 [0.000 ]  [0.000] [ 0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000 ] 
Sargan OIR  6.917 1.823 4.998 4.401 4.525 1.720 
 [0.140 ]  [0.609 ] [0.287 ]  [0.221 ] [0.209 ]  [0.786 ] 
Adjusted R² -0.046 0.476 -0.040 0.231 0.030 -0.026 
Fisher 1.371 28.309*** 1.252 32.227*** 4.042*** 1.470 
Observations  125 125 125 125 125 125 
       
Instruments  Constant; Constitution;  Main_IP_law;  IP_rlaw;  Wipo_treaties;  Mutilateral; 
Bilateral;  LM_Income;  M_Income;  H_Income; English; Christians. 
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions.  [] :P-values. z-statistics in 
brackets. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Table 7: Effect of governance on FDI inflows (with HAC standard errors)  
 Dependent variable: FDI Inflows  
Constant  -8.092 -0.392 -5.771 0.008 1.912 1.005 
 (-1.018) (-0.082) (-0.483) (0.001) (0.214) (0.149) 
Voice & Accountability  -1.563 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (-1.024)      
Political Stability  --- 0.555 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.621)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -1.971 --- --- --- 
   (-0.576) 1.472   
Regulation Quality  --- --- --- (1.381) --- --- 
       
Rule of Law --- --- --- --- 0.977 --- 
     (0.491)  
Control of Corruption  --- --- --- --- --- 0.261 
      (0.164) 
Population Growth -0.812 -1.150 -1.653** -0.709 -1.259 -1.720** 
 (-0.976) (-1.241) (-2.334) (-0.867) (-1.288) (-2.440) 
Inflation 0.249 0.117 0.122 0.143 0.126 0.118 
 (1.424) (1.128) (1.020) (1.208) (1.137) (1.116) 
Government Expenditure 0.211** 0.203** 0.178 0.244** 0.151 0.131 
 (2.324) (2.084) (1.361) (2.532) (1.237) (1.134) 
Economic Prosperity  0.500 1.116 1.873* 0.501 1.399 2.051** 
 (0.385) (0.866) (1.921) (0.431) (1.025) (2.153) 
Domestic Investment  -0.129 -0.057 -0.205 0.036 -0.047 -0.119 
 (-0.670) (-0.294) (-0.877) (0.182) (-0.262) (-0.488) 
Financial Size 8.266 -0.932 4.841 -3.016 -3.951 -3.007 
 (0.870) (-0.204) (0.478) (-0.612) (-0.525) (-0.582) 
Financial Efficiency  3.675 1.076 2.436 2.329 0.056 -0.279 
 (1.018) (0.368) (0.434) (0.963) (0.014) (-0.088) 
       
Hausman test  31.723*** 22.486*** 25.020*** 18.92** 24.114*** 23.747*** 
 [0.000 ]  [ 0.004] [0.001 ]  [0.015] [0.002 ]  [0.002 ] 
Sargan OIR  11.393*** 11.496*** 7.422 13.199*** 10.126** 7.368 
 [0.009 ]  [0.009] [0.115 ]  [ 0.004] [0.017]  [0.117] 
Adjusted R² 0.021 0.049 -0.002 0.113 0.041 0.011 
Fisher 2.737*** 2.052** 1.562 3.512*** 0.966 1.217 
Observations  141 141 141 141 141 141 
       
Instruments  Constant; Constitution;  Main_IP_law;  IP_rlaw;  Wipo_treaties;  Mutilateral; 
Bilateral;  LM_Income;  M_Income;  H_Income; English; Christians. 
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions.  [] :P-values. z-statistics in 
brackets. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. 
 
 
 
4.2 Discussion of results and policy and further implications   
 
 Before discussing the results, we highlight once again the need for an understanding of 
the factors and forces that would determine the KE in SSA and MENA countries. The 
importance of link between KE and governance has been recognized.. The main idea behind 
this recognition is that the process of creation and diffusion of knowledge depends on 
appropriate governance policies that are the outcome of good governance. Therefore, it is 
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essential to identify the institutional factors that promote the creation and diffusion of 
knowledge in SSA and MENA countries which have been subject to less scholarly attention. 
The identification permits assessing how the enforcement of IP laws by formal institutions has 
affected the KEs in these countries.  
 The findings demonstrate that the enforcement of IPR reaties through good 
governance mechanisms is not a sufficient condition for greater KE in SSA and MENA 
countries. If any positive effect exists between formal institutions and KE in these nations, 
then other instruments besides the upholding of IPR treaties (laws) elucidate it. However, our 
findings may alternatively reflect the Chinese model of KE. For instance, though there has 
been a clear positive relationship between good governance and the creation of KE in much of 
East Asia, China has largely remained an exception to this rule. China’s KE development 
appears to come from the country’s FDI function. The country’s success story in attracting 
FDI is attributed to its spectacular growth track record, relatively better executive power, 
good infrastructure, abundant educated labor force, and a large domestic market (Chandra & 
Yokoyama, 2011, p. 46). It seems likely that SSA and MENA countries are in the same 
paradigm as China with respect to the impact of good governance measures on KE.  
From another standpoint, it has been well documented in the literature that the ‘East 
Asian miracle’ is largely indebted to less stringent IPRs at the early stages of the economic 
development of the region. This supports the thesis that the changing strength of IPR regimes 
depends on a nation’s level of development and/or current technological ability. Evidence 
further suggests that the “East Asian miracle” could have been caused by weaker IPR regimes 
at the early stages of these nations’ development in addition to their accumulation of capital. 
These nations’ capacity to absorb, replicate and duplicate foreign innovations may have 
contributed to their relatively high growth rates and KE tendencies. It has been further noted 
that as these countries became significant producers of new technologies and innovations, 
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their IPR regimes tightened (Nelson & Pack, 1999). Therefore, our findings are in line with 
Nelson & Pack’s (1999) postulation that the assimilation of existing (foreign) productive 
techniques and technologies was a critical component of the success with KE of these 
countries as opposed to SSA and MENA nations. This view is perpendicular (contrary) to 
Maskus’s (2000) caution that weaker protection of IPRs will not necessarily be beneficial for 
developing countries as it may cause them to remain dependent on older and less efficient 
technologies.  
The findings are also consistent with the Chinese model insofar as they conform to 
some studies on wealth-effects that have established the existence of a non-linear relationship 
between income-levels and IPRs (Kim, 2004; Maskus & Penubarti, 1995). These studies 
substantiate that patent protection tends to improve as economies move from low to middle-
income stages, but that eventually patent protection decreases with the ability to imitate new 
technologies. The substance of the matter in this line of thought is that IPRs are thought to be 
successful at spurring economic growth and activity only after a nation has acquired sufficient 
human capital and technology infrastructure for creative imitation to take place. Accordingly, 
strong IPR protection in the early stages of industrialization, when knowledge and technology 
can only be acquired through reverse engineering, duplication and/or imitation, may thus 
hamper technology transfers in SSA and MENA countries. 
Examining the findings further in the light of very recent African IPR literature 
(Andrés & Asongu, 2013b), reveals that results from the education dimension of KE are 
compatible with the thesis  that adoption of tight IPR regimes may  negatively affect human 
development by diminishing the literacy rate  and restricting diffusion of knowledge. Andrés 
& Asongu (2013b) however document that adherence to international IPRs protection treaties 
(laws) may not impede per capita economic prosperity and could improve life-expectancy. 
 Two major policy and, three further research implications emerge from our findings. 
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One, the enforcement of very tight IPR regimes through good governance mechanisms is not 
a sufficient condition for the KE in SSA and MENA countries. At their current level of 
development enforcement of strict IPR regimes in these countries could seriously undermine 
efforts towards KE by restricting the dissemination of knowledge, ICTs, and innovation. Two, 
there are other crucial determinants of KE besides the upholding of IPRs through good 
governance mechanisms; the Chinese model of the KE is an alternative example, and a better 
reflection of what is happening in MENA and SSA countries. One implication for further 
research is to subject the same data assembled in this paper to alternative estimation 
techniques. Another is to deploy alternative statistical techniques and estimation methods than 
PCA, acquire more and better data, and enlarge the sample of the countries to be investigated. 
Lucas and Moll (2013) proposed an intriguing model by which an economy uses its old 
knowledge to produce goods while at the same time “interacting with others in search for 
new, productivity-increasing ideas”. In this sense economies do not necessarily have to 
abandon product-based activities for KEs. The last implication is to examine more directly the 
Chinese KE model to find out if it is the appropriate model of the SSA-MENA region. 
  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 Despite the growing importance of the KE, the debate has centered on Latin America 
and East Asian countries, leaving the situation surrounding MENA and SSA countries 
unexplained. This paper is a modest attempt to fill the gap in our understanding of factors 
responsible for stimulating KE in this group of nations. It assesses how the upholding to IPR 
laws (treaties) by formal institutions affects various components of the KE. The results show 
that the enforcement of IPR laws (treaties) is not a sufficient condition for a greater KE. One 
may conclude that tight IPR regimes are not a sufficient condition for KE in SSA and MENA 
countries. Such laws (treaties) could even seriously undermine efforts towards KE by 
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restricting dissemination of knowledge, ICTs and innovation. Obviously, this is not good 
news for countries wishing to stimulate their KEs. However, it might also be possible that the 
IPRs and their enforcement are not a necessary condition for the KE either, because there are 
other crucial determinants of the KE besides the upholding of IPRs. Indeed, the extent to 
which the control variables have stronger, more consistent and technically efficient short-run 
impacts on KE than governance variables implies that the Chinese model of the KE may be a 
relevant model of the experience with KE of MENA and SSA countries. Even so, both the 
findings and policy implications they recommend point toward a need for further research in 
this area. Until that is done, the results of this paper and their concluding implications should 
be interpreted cautiously.   
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Appendices 
 
Table A1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
       
 Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
 
 
Knowledge 
Economy  
Educatex(Education) -0.038 1.370 -4.344 1.858 126 
ICTex(Information & Infrastructure) 0.028 1.440 -3.750 3.183 310 
Tradex(First Economic Incentive) -0.058 1.143 -2.901 2.635 161 
Creditex(Second Economic Incentive) 0.118 1.224 -2.296 3.488 193 
Scientific and Technical Journals  2.142 0.676 0.518 3.821 284 
Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 3.119 3.908 -4.025 33.566 319 
       
 
 
Governance  
Voice & Accountability -0.603 0.669 -1.960 1.009 264 
Rule of Law  -0.063 0.727 -1.606 1.258 264 
Regulation Quality  -0.224 0.740 -2.047 1.111 264 
Government Effectiveness  -0.082 0.644 -1.234 1.345 264 
Political Stability  -0.271 0.884 -2.222 1.169 264 
Corruption Control  -0.102 0.725 -1.322 1.680 264 
       
 
 
 
Control 
variables  
Population growth  2.759 2.668 -0.157 18.588 330 
Inflation 5.585 6.274 -9.797 43.073 296 
Government Expenditure  12.318 11.321 -34.88 80.449 295 
Economic Prosperity  4.689 3.450 -4.300 26.750 313 
Domestic  Investment 20.531 6.910 -1.380 39.348 301 
Financial Size 0.851 0.216 0.124 1.609 261 
Financial  Depth 0.523 0.291 0.121 1.279 240 
Financial Efficiency  0.751 0.288 0.143 2.103 308 
       
 
 
 
 
Instrumental 
variables  
Constitution 0.150 0.357 0.000 1.000 300 
Main Intellectual Property Law 1.366 1.534 0.000 7.000 300 
Intellectual Property Rights Law  1.130 1.793 0.000 7.000 300 
WIPO Treaties  2.453 1.219 0.000 6.000 300 
Multilateral Treaties 8.440 3.948 0.000 20.00 300 
Bilateral Treaties  0.380 0.806 0.000 4.000 300 
Lower Middle Income  0.363 0.481 0.000 1.000 330 
Middle Income  0.590 0.492 0.000 1.000 330 
High Income  0.318 0.466 0.000 1.000 330 
English  0.409 0.492 0.000 1.000 330 
Christian  0.227 0.419 0.000 1.000 330 
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Algeria, Bahrain, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Zambia.  
       
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  
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Table A2  : Correlation analysis  
Knowledge Economy Governance Control variables Instrumental variables  
E ICT Tra Cre Jrs FDI VA RL RQ GE PS CC Popg Infl Gov Gro DI FS FD FE Co
n 
MI
P 
IP
R 
Wi
po 
Mu
l 
Bil L
MI 
MI HI En
g 
Ch
r 
 
1 0.3 -0.3 -0.8 0.4 0.26 0.12 0.51 0.02 0.5 -0.06 0.50 -0.24 -0.33 0.60 0.11 0.07 0.53 0.61 0.22 0.0 0.4 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 -0.0 -0.3 E 
 1.0 -0.2 -0.4 0.4 0.16 -0.15 0.01 -0.19 0.0 -0.22 0.03 0.09 -0.15 0.17 0.05 0.01 0.45 0.26 0.18 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.0 -0.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.2 ICT 
  1.0 0.4 0.1 -0.42 -0.16 -0.58 -0.50 -0.5 -0.36 -0.54 -0.44 0.02 -0.28 -0.26 -0.18 -0.31 -0.33 -0.22 -0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.3 -0.0 0.4 0.4 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 Tra 
   1.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.18 -0.6 -0.04 -0.64 -0.08 0.46 -0.44 -0.11 -0.15 -0.55 -0.78 -0.39 -0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.2 0.6 Cre 
    1.0 0.07 0.03 0.16 -0.28 0.2 -0.34 0.13 -0.10 -0.18 0.1 -0.10 -0.11 0.2 0.3 0.3 -0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 Jrs 
     1.00 -0.01 0.13 0.18 0.1 -0.01 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.1 0.19 0.16 0.05 0.2 -0.03 -0.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 FDI 
      1.00 0.47 0.20 0.5 0.14 0.47 -0.14 0.07 -0.08 0.001 0.20 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.2 0.4 VA 
       1.00 0.68 0.8 0.62 0.9 0.19 -0.27 0.23 0.13 0.38 0.3 0.5 0.4 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.6 0.1 -0.1 RL 
        1.00 0.5 0.71 0.61 0.25 -0.16 -0.08 0.13 0.49 0.3 0.3 0.16 -0.0 -0.3 -0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 RQ 
         1.0 0.49 0.89 0.22 -0.30 0.173 0.08 0.37 0.4 0.5 0.47 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.5 0.0 -0.1 GE 
          1.00 0.59 0.25 -0.14 -0.007 0.15 0.38 0.09 0.08 0.26 -0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 PS 
           1.00 0.31 -0.26 0.24 0.16 0.35 0.45 0.47 0.40 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.6 0.1 -0.1 CC 
            1.00 0.07 0.10 0.40 0.17 0.02 -0.13 0.16 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.4 0.1 -0.1 Popg 
             1.00 -0.20 0.13 -0.15 -0.37 -0.31 -0.19 -0.1 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.3 Infl 
              1.00 0.04 -0.03 0.21 0.26 0.09 0.2 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.5 -0.0 -0.3 Gov 
               1.00 0.15 0.08 0.005 0.12 0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 Gro 
                1.00 0.27 0.29 -0.14 0.2 -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.3 0.0 DI 
                 1.00 0.37 0.33 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.3 -0.0 -0.1 FS 
                  1.00 0.12 -0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 FD 
                   1.00 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.0 0.2 -0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.1 FE 
                    1.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.2 -0.0 -0.2 Con 
                     1.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 MIP 
                      1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 IPR 
                       1.0 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 Wipo 
                        1.0 0.2 0.5 0.4 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 Mul 
                         1.0 0.0 -0.0 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 Bil 
                          1.0 0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 LMI 
                           1.0 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 MI 
                            1.0 0.2 -0.3 HI 
                             1.0 0.4 Eng 
                              1.0 Chr 
                                
E: Educatex. ICT: ICTex. Trad: Tradex. Cre:Creditex. Jrs: Technical & Scientific Journals. FDI: Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality. 
PS:Political Stability. CC: Corruption Control. Popg:Population growth. Infl:Inflation. Gov: Government Expenditure. Gro: Economic Prosperity.  DI: Domestic Investment. FS: Financial Size. FD: Financial Depth. FE: 
Financial Efficiency. Con: IPlaws  enshrined in countries’ constitution. MIP: Main Intellectual Property law. IPR: Intellectual Property Rights law. Wipo: World Intellectual Property Organization. Mul: Multilateral 
treaties. Bil: Bilteral treaties. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle Income. HI: Income Income. Eng: English. Chr: Christian.   
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Table A3: Variable definitions 
    
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Panel A: Dimensions in Knowledge Economy(KE) 
 
Primary School Enrolment  PSE Log of PSE World Bank(WDI) 
    
Secondary School Enrolment  SSE Log of SSE World Bank(WDI) 
    
Tertiary School Enrolment  TSE Log of TSE World Bank(WDI) 
    
Education in KE Educatex  First PC of PSE, SSE & TSE PCA 
    
Internet  Users  Internet Log of Internet  World Bank(WDI) 
    
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions  Mobile Log of Mobile World Bank(WDI) 
    
Telephone lines Tel Log of Tel World Bank(WDI) 
    
Information & Infrastructure in KE ICTex First PC of Internet, Mobile & Tel PCA 
    
Trade Openness  Trade  Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% 
of GDP) 
World Bank(WDI) 
    
Tariff  Barriers  Tariff  Tariff rate, most favored nation, weighted 
mean, all products (%) 
World Bank(WDI) 
    
1st  Economic Incentive dimension in KE Tradex  First PC of Trade & Tariff PCA 
    
Private domestic credit  Credit Private domestic credit (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Interest rate spread Spread Lending rate minus deposit rate (%) World Bank(WDI) 
    
2nd Economic Incentive dimension in KE Creditex First PC of Credit and Spread PCA 
    
1
st
 Innovation dimension in KE Journals  Log of  Number of Technical & Scientific 
Journals 
World Bank(WDI) 
    
2
nd
  Innovation dimension  in KE FDI Net Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Panel B: Good Governance Dynamics  
    
Rule of Law R.L Rule of Law (estimate) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Regulation Quality  R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate)  World Bank(WDI) 
    
Government Effectiveness Gov. E Government Effectiveness (estimate)  World Bank(WDI) 
    
Voice and Accountability  V & A Voice and Accountability (estimate) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Political Stability/ No Violence  PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate).  World Bank(WDI) 
    
Control of Corruption  CC Control of Corruption (estimate)  World Bank(WDI) 
    
Panel C: Control Variables  
    
Government Expenditure  Gov. 
Exp. 
Government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
World Bank(WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Population   Growth Popg Population Growth Rate (annual %) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Savings  Savings Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
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Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Domestic  Investment  DI Gross Domestic Investment (% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Financial Depth  M2 Broad Money Supply (% of GDP)  World Bank(FDSD) 
    
Financial Efficiency  BcBd Bank Credit on Banking Deposits World Bank(FDSD) 
    
Financial Size  Dbacba  Deposit bank assets /(Deposit bank assets 
plus Central bank assets) 
World Bank(FDSD) 
    
Panel D: Instrumental Variables  
Constitution  Con IPRs enshrined in country’s constitution  WIPO 
    
Main_IP_law MIPlaw Main Intellectual Property Law WIPO 
    
IP_rlaw IPrlaw Intellectual Property Rights Law WIPO 
    
Wipo_treaties Wipo World Intellectual Property Organization  WIPO 
    
Mutilateral Multiter Multilateral Treaties  WIPO 
    
Bilateral Bilater Bilateral  Treaties  WIPO 
    
Legal origins   English Common Law and French Civil 
Law Countries  
La Porta et al. (2008, 
p.289) 
    
Income levels   Low, Middle, Lower Middle, Upper 
Middle & High Income  
World Bank(WDI) 
    
Religious domination   Christians & Muslims  CIA The WFB(2011) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. WIPO: World Intellectual Propert y 
Organization. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PC: Principal Component. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. Log: logarithm. CIA: 
Central Intelligence Agency. WFB: World Factbook.  
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